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Mark My Words, this is a Heavy
Weight to Carry: The Eleventh
Circuit Court Sets the Standard
Weight Given to a Presumption of
Validity of a Registered Mark *
I. INTRODUCTION
The proof is in the pudding. Proving something by a preponderance of
the evidence is a tough burden to bear. In any civil case, the party who
bears the burden of proof is at a disadvantage from the beginning.
Accordingly, courts take their time deciding which party has to
ultimately persuade the court to find in its favor. While history has
decided many questions about who bears the burden, the same is not true
in trademark law.1 Courts have had immense difficulty determining
which party, in trademark cases, loses if the evidence is balanced.2 This
note examines a continuing split in the courts and a case only recently
decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
choosing which approach to ultimately follow.
The Lanham Act3 provides that in a mark’s cancellation proceeding,
a party who owns a mark registered on the principal register has a
rebuttable presumption of validity.4 In effect, this presumption shifts the
burden of production5 from the trademark holder to the party seeking
* J.D. Candidate. Florida State University (B.A., cum laude, 2019); Mercer University
School of Law (J.D. Candidate, Phi Delta Phi Honors Society, Member, 2022). Member,
Mercer Law Review (2020-2022); Managing Editor (2021-2022).
1 6 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 32:138 n.6
(5th ed. 2020).
2 Id.
3 Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946).
4 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2020).
5 “Which party bears the obligation to come forward with evidence at different points in
the proceeding.” Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005) (citing Director, Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272 (1994)).
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cancellation of the mark.6 The statute is silent on which party bears the
burden of persuasion.7 As a result, circuits are split on the issue. The
majority of courts holds that the party seeking cancellation also bears the
burden of persuasion.8 A minority of courts holds that the trademark
registrant keeps the burden of persuasion.9 Some circuits have yet to
decide whether to follow the majority or minority of courts. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is one of them. And so,
In Royal Palm Props., LLC v. Pink Palm Props., LLC,10 the Eleventh
Circuit followed the majority of courts and thus held, the party
requesting cancellation of a mark bears both the burden of production
and the ultimate burden of persuasion.11
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Royal Palm Properties (Royal Palm), a real-estate agency, specialized
in buying and selling million-dollar homes in a high-end residential
community located in Boca Raton, Florida, called Royal Palm Yacht &
Country Club.12 One of Royal Palm’s competitors, Pink Palm Properties
(Pink Palm), a real-estate brokerage, was also located in Boca Raton,
Florida. Pink Palm bought and sold luxury homes in various
neighborhoods, including Royal Palm Yacht & Country Club. Only a
portion of Pink Palm’s business involved Royal Palm Yacht & Country
Club’s homes.13
Royal Palm applied for and obtained registration on the service mark14
“Royal Palm Properties” in 2012 from the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO).15 In 2015, Royal Palm attempted to register “Royal Palm
Properties” combined with an “RP” logo from the PTO. The PTO denied
registration of the “composite trademark”16 for being “confusingly
Royal Palm Props., LLC v. Pink Palm Props., LLC, 950 F.3d 776, 783 (11th Cir. 2020).
“[I]dentifies which party must persuade the fact-finder in its favor to prevail and also
identifies the party that loses if the evidence is balanced.” 6 McCarthy, § 32:138. (citing
Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P'ship, 564 U.S. 91, 100 n.4, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245 (2011)).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 950 F.3d 776 (11th Cir. 2020).
11 Royal Palm Props., LLC, 950 F.3d at 783.
12 Id. at 780.
13 Id. at 781.
14 “Royal Palm Properties” is registered as a service mark, but throughout this article,
will be referred to as a trademark interchangeably.
15 Id. at 780.
16 “A trademark or service mark made up of several words that form a distinctive whole,
even if the individual words are ordinary.” Composite Trademark, Black’s Law Dictionary
(11th ed. 2019).
6
7
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similar”17 to two existing marks recorded in the Federal Registry in 2007
and 2008.18 These marks, “Royale Palms” and “Royale Palms at Kingston
Shores,” were registered by a Texas real estate company.19
In 2017, Royal Palm saw a link to property listings in Royal Palm
Yacht & Country Club on Pink Properties’ website, named “Royal Palm
Properties.”20 Royal Palm, believing Pink Palm infringed on its
trademark, requested that it stop using Royal Palm’s mark on its
website. Pink Palm eventually took the link down to avoid further
dispute. However, Royal Palm claimed the damage was already done.21
Royal Palm filed suit on April 17, 2017, against Pink Palm in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.22 The
complaint alleged that in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114,23
Pink Palm had “infringed its registered service mark, ‘Royal Palm
Properties.’”24 In its answer, Pink Palm denied infringement and filed a
counterclaim for a declaration that Royal Palm’s trademark lacked the
requirements needed for trademark protection. The jury upheld the
service mark but found Pink Palm had not infringed it.25 After the jury
returned its verdict, Pink Palm renewed its motion for judgment as a
matter of law on its trademark cancellation claim.26 The trial court
granted the motion, invalidating the “Royal Palm Properties”
registration. The PTO can only register certain “distinctive” marks under
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(3)(D),27 and the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida found that the “Royal
Palms Properties” mark was not distinctive. The district court found that
the PTO wrongly allowed registration of the mark. Therefore, the court
held the cancellation of Royal Palm’s mark was proper.28
Royal Palm Props., LLC, 950 F.3d at 781.
This did not affect the “Royal Palm Properties” mark that was registered in 2012. Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) provides:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant- use in commerce
any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark
in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or…shall be liable in a civil action
by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided…
24 Royal Palm Props., LLC, 950 F.3d at 781.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(3)(D) (2018).
28 Royal Palm Props., LLC, 950 F.3d at 781–82.
17
18
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Royal Palm appealed.29 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgment.30 The court held that
Pink Palm had the burden to show, by preponderant evidence, that the
mark, “Royal Palm Properties,” lacked distinctiveness and failed to make
the requisite showing.31
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Is it Protectable?
A service mark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof–used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish the
services of one person, including a unique service, from the services of
others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that source is
unknown.”32 A mark is distinctive when consumers identify the mark
with the represented goods or services.33 A mark can either be
“inherently” distinctive or can “acquire distinctiveness.”34 There are four
categories of distinctiveness.35 One category of distinctiveness is a
descriptive term, which identifies a quality or characteristic of a service.36
A descriptive term, since not inherently distinctive, can gain service
mark protection only if it acquires distinctiveness through secondary
meaning.37
A service mark has acquired secondary meaning when, in the public
mind, the name is associated with the source of the service, and not just
the service itself.38 In other words, the targeted audience identifies the

Id.
Id. at 790.
31 Id. at 786.
32 Though service marks and trademarks are slightly different, they will be used
interchangeably throughout this article. Lovely Skin, Inc. v. Ishtar Skin Care Prods., LLC,
745 F.3d 877, 882 n.3 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018)).
33 Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509 F.3d 1351, 1357 (11th Cir. 2007).
34 Id.
35 Am. Tv & Communs. Corp. v. Am. Communs. & Tv, Inc., 810 F.2d 1546, 1548 (11th
Cir 1987).
36 There are three other categories of distinctiveness: generic; suggestive; and arbitrary
or fanciful. “A generic name suggests the basic nature of the article or service.” A suggestive
term suggests a characteristic of the services and would require use of the imagination of
the consumer to be understood as descriptive. Lastly, an arbitrary or fanciful name has not
relationship to the services. A generic name is generally incapable of achieving service mark
protection. Suggestive and arbitrary or fanciful marks are inherently distinctive and
therefore, protectible without proof of a secondary meaning. Id. at 1548–49.
37 Id.
38 1 Anne Gilson Lalonde, Gilson on Trademarks § 2.06 (2020).
29
30
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term as a single service from a single company.39 Establishing secondary
meaning of a descriptive term requires a high degree of proof.40
The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) may only grant applications
for registration to marks that are distinctive.41 Under Section 2(f) of the
Lanham Act,42 marks that have acquired distinctiveness through
secondary meaning are permitted registration with the PTO.43 Thus, a
service mark registered “under Section 2(f) creates a rebuttable
presumption that the mark has attained secondary meaning.”44 Once the
PTO grants the registration of a mark, it is officially registered on the
principal register, provided no party has succeeded in opposing the
registration.45
Once a party has registered a trademark, there is a presumption of
validity on the mark.46 A party can still petition for cancellation of the
mark.47 Under 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a)48 of the Lanham Act, any mark
registered by the PTO is “prima facie evidence of the validity of the
registered mark and of the registration of the mark.”49 Since the Supreme
Court of the United States has yet to establish a uniform standard
regarding what weight courts should give to prima facie evidence of
validity, the lower courts have developed an approach on their own.50

39 Am. Tv & Communs. Corp., 810 F.2d at 1549 (citing American Heritage Life Insurance
Co. v. Heritage Life Insurance Co., 494 F.2d 3, 12 (5th Cir. 1974)).
40 Id. The Eleventh Circuit uses four factors to decide if a descriptive mark has acquired
distinctiveness:
(1) the length and manner of its use; (2) the nature and extent of advertising and
promotion; (3) the efforts made by the plaintiff to promote a conscious connection
in the public’s mind between the name and the plaintiff’s product or business;
and (4) the extent to which the public actually identifies the name with the
plaintiff’s product or venture.
Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1513 (11th Cir. 1984).
41 § 1052(f).
42 § 1052(f).
43 Lalonde, § 2.06, n.3.
44 Id.
45 § 1052.
46 Royal Palm Props., LLC, 950 F.3d at 784.
47 Coach House Rest., Inc. v. Coach & Six Rests., Inc., 934 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir
1991).
48 § 1115(a).
49 § 1115(a).
50 Royal Palm Props., LLC, 950 F.3d at 783.
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B. To Share the Burden or Not to Share the Burden
1. The Majority Approach
The majority of courts51 holds that the burden of persuasion is on the
party attempting to cancel the registration of a mark, connoting, the
party seeking cancellation has the ultimate burden of proving the
registration is invalid by a preponderance of the evidence.52 Courts will
generally acquiesce to the decision of the PTO in deciding to register a
mark.53 In 1958, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit made one of the earliest showing of deference to PTO’s decisions.54
In Aluminum Fabricating Co. v. Season-All Window Corp.,55 the Second
Circuit held, where the PTO allowed registration of a mark, a strong
presumption of validity of the mark is given.56 The court explained that
while the circuit courts have jurisdiction to hear cancellation
proceedings, courts should be wary of overruling the actions of the PTO.57
Congress granted the PTO power to make preliminary decisions on
whether a mark achieved federal trademark protection.58 The party
requesting cancellation must prove that the board erred in registering
the mark by a preponderance of the evidence.59 Accordingly, courts
should only cancel a registered mark where the opposing party has put
forth more evidence than the registrant to tip the scales in its favor.60
The registrant of a mark registered under Section 2(f) of the Lanham
Act receives a presumption of acquired distinctiveness.61 In 1994, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit analyzed whether
registered marks receive a presumption of both inherent and acquired
distinctiveness.62 In Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc.,63 the court held

51 The circuits that follow the majority holding are the First, Second, Sixth, Eighth,
Tenth, District of Columbia, Federal, (and now) Eleventh Circuits. 6 McCarthy, supra note
1 § 32:138.
52 Cold War Museum, Inc. v. Cold War Air Museum, Inc., 586 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
53 Aluminum Fabricating Co. v. Season-All Window Corp., 259 F.2d 314, 316 (2nd Cir.
1958).
54 See Aluminum Fabricating Co., 259 F.2d 314.
55 259 F.2d 314 (2nd Cir. 1958).
56 Aluminum Fabricating Co., 259 F.2d at 317.
57 Aluminum Fabricating Co., 259 F.2d at 316.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 869 (8th Cir. 1994).
62 See Aromatique, Inc., 28 F.3d 863.
63 28 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 1994).
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that the presumption given to a mark depends on whether the PTO
required evidence of a secondary meaning.64 Since the PTO required
Aromatique, Inc. to show proof of secondary meaning, Aromatique, Inc.’s
mark retains a strong presumption that the mark has acquired
distinctiveness.65 Had the PTO granted Aromatique, Inc. registration
without proof of secondary meaning, Aromatique, Inc. would have a
strong presumption of inherent distinctiveness.66 A mark is only given a
presumption for the kind of distinctiveness it was registered as.67
In the early 2000s, circuit courts began discussing what happens if the
party seeking cancellation meets its initial burden of production.68 In
Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V. Trading Corp.,69 the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the burden of proof shifts to the
trademark registrant only if the party seeking cancellation brings forth
enough evidence to overcome the initial burden of production.70
Borinquen Biscuit Corp. registered the mark “RICA” and its packaging,
for its semi-sweet galleta in 1969.71 In 2003, M.V. Trading Corp. began
selling a similar looking galleta under the name “Nestle Ricas.” After a
failed attempt at requesting that M.V. Trading Corp. stop selling their
galleta using the name “Ricas,” Borinquen Biscuit Corp. brought this suit
alleging trademark infringement.72 The First Circuit held, if the
defendant has met its initial burden of production by showing that the
registered mark is merely descriptive, the burden of proof shifts back to
the party seeking protection to show that its mark has acquired
secondary meaning.73 But, since M.V. Trading Corp. did not show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the mark, “RICA,” was merely
descriptive, Borinquen Biscuit Corp. was not required to bring forth

Id. at 870.
Id. at 869.
66 Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V. Trading Corp., 443 F.3d 112, 117 (1st Cir. 2006).
67 Aromatique, Inc., 28 F.3d at 869.
68 See Borinquen Biscuit Corp., 443 F.3d 112.
69 443 F.3d 112 (1st Cir. 2006).
70 Borinquen Biscuit Corp., 443 F.3d at 118.
71 A galleta is a Spanish word that when translated to English refers to all cookies,
crackers, and biscuits. Id. at 114.
72 M.V. brought a counterclaim requesting cancellation of Borinquen’s mark. During a
preliminary injunction hearing, the court found that Borinquen was likely to succeed in
establishing that its mark required protection and that M.V.’s “Nestle Ricas” mark
infringed on Borinquen’s registered mark. Therefore, M.V. filed this interlocutory appeal
alleging the district court erred in concluding Borinquen did not need to establish that its
mark, “RICA,” had acquired secondary meaning. Id.
73 Id. at 118.
64
65
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evidence proving its mark had acquired secondary meaning.74 Other
circuit courts began following the decision in Borinquen Biscuit Corp.75
In Cold War Museum, Inc. v. Cold War Air Museum, Inc.,76 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit discussed which burdens
shift to the party who is seeking to cancel registration of a trademark.77
This appeal arose from the PTO, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
granting a petition to cancel registration of the trademark, “THE COLD
WAR MUSEUM.” The PTO found the mark merely descriptive of
museum services regarding the cold war when it was registered.78
The Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling and held that
Cold War Museum, Inc., registrant, was not required to bring forth any
evidence because Cold War Air Museum, Inc., the petitioner for
cancellation, failed to prove a prima facie case that the mark lacked
acquired distinctiveness.79 To establish a prima facie case, the petitioner
“must ‘present sufficient evidence or argument on which the board could
reasonably conclude’ that the party has overcome the record evidence of
acquired distinctiveness.”80 The court explained that the burden of
producing evidence defending registration shifts to the registrant, only
if, the party seeking cancellation establishes a sufficient showing of
invalidity.81 Once both parties have presented all of their evidence, the
court must decide whether the party petitioning cancellation had reached
its ultimate burden on persuasion.82
Further, in Lovely Skin, Inc. v. Ishtar Skin Care Prods., LLC,83 the
Eighth Circuit established the focus of inquiry when determining
whether to shift the burden of proof back to the registrant.84 The court
stated that when the PTO registers a mark, the outcome of the case no
longer rests upon whether the registrant provided evidence of acquired
distinctiveness at the time of their registrations.85 Rather, it depends on
whether the party seeking cancellation met its burden of establishing

Id. at 118–19.
See Cold War Museum, Inc., 586 F.3d 1352; Lovely Skin, Inc., 745 F.3d 877.
76 586 F.3d 1352.
77 Id. at 1359.
78 Id. at 1354.
79 Id.
80 Id. (quoting Yamaha Int’l Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., 840 F.2d 1572, 1576–77 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
81 Id. at 1358.
82 Id.
83 745 F.3d 877 (8th Cir. 2014).
84 See id.
85 Id. at 886.
74
75
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that the registrant’s trademark lacked acquired distinctiveness at the
time the mark was registered.86
2. The Minority Approach87
A minority of courts holds that the party seeking cancellation has
overcome the rebuttable presumption when it has established the generic
or descriptive nature of the mark.88 In Amazing Spaces, Inc. v. Metro
Mini Storage,89 Amazing Spaces, Inc. (Amazing Spaces), a self-storage
services company and trademark registrant, brought suit against a
competitor for trademark infringement.90 Metro Mini Storage (Metro),
the competitor, counterclaimed, alleging that Amazing Spaces made false
representations in its registration application. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment for
Metro on the grounds that Amazing Spaces’ mark was an invalid service
mark.91 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held, Amazing Spaces’ service mark was not a legally protectable
trademark.92 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that once sufficient evidence of
invalidity is produced to overcome the presumption, though the evidence
remains, the presumption is deemed “neutralized”93 and is no longer at
issue in the case.94
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
began its analysis of the meaning of presumption in Liquid Controls
Corp. v. Liquid Control Corp.95 There, the plaintiff, Liquid Controls
Corp., a liquid control manufacturing corporation, secured federal
trademark protection on the term “Liquid Controls” in 1984, which it has
been using since 1956. The defendant, Liquid Control Corp., a liquid
dispenser corporation, began using the name “Liquid Control” on their
products in 1973. After registering their mark, Liquid Controls Corp.
filed a complaint against Liquid Control Corp. in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division
alleging trademark infringement, consumer confusion, and two state law
Id. at 886.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits all
follow this approach. 6 McCarthy § 32:138 n.6.
88 Xtreme Lashes, LLC v. Xtended Beauty, Inc., 576 F.3d 221, 232 (5th Cir. 2009).
89 608 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2010).
90 The registrant also brought claims for trade dress infringement, copyright
infringement, unfair competition, and violation of Texas Anti-Dilution Statute. Id. at 230.
91 Id. at 233.
92 Id. at 239.
93 Id. at 239.
94 Id.
95 802 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1986).
86
87
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claims.96 Liquid Control Corp. filed a motion for summary judgment,
which the lower court granted.97
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that there was no issue of
material fact on whether the term “liquid controls” was generic and
caused consumer confusion, affirming the district court’s grant of
summary judgment.98 The circuit court reasoned that while the plaintiff
had a presumption that its registered mark was not generic or merely
descriptive, or, if it was, then the mark had achieved secondary meaning,
the presumption is overcome once the defendant meets its burden of
production by showing genericness or descriptiveness.99 Thus, the
presumption “bursts” once sufficient evidence of genericness is
brought.100 Therefore, there is no longer a genuine issue of material fact
preventing summary judgment.101
Later, in Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Sys., Inc.,102 the Seventh
Circuit expanded on its view of the deference to give a presumption.103
Door Systems, Inc. (Door Systems) filed a complaint against Pro-Line
Door Systems, Inc. (Pro-Line) alleging a violation of both § 32 of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)104 and § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a),105
trademark infringement and false designation of origin.106 Both Door
Systems and Pro-Line sold overhead, electric garage doors together with
the remote to open and close them. Door Systems had been selling these
products under the mark “Door Systems” since 1980 and registered the
trademark in 1989. In 1986, the defendant incorporated Pro-Line and
began doing business. The district court granted Pro-Line’s motion for
summary judgment on both counts, finding that “door systems” was a
generic term and therefore cannot be trademark protected. Thus, the
likelihood of confusion claim was nil.107
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding.108
The court reiterated its stance on presumption of validity stating, “The
presumption of validity that federal registration confers . . . evaporates
Id. at 935.
Id.
98 Id. at 941.
99 Id. at 938.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 83 F.3d 169 (7th Cir. 1996).
103 Id.
104 § 1114(1).
105 § 1125(a).
106 Door Sys., Inc., 83 F.3d at 170.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 174.
96
97
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as soon as evidence of invalidity is presented.”109 Further, the court states
that the only function of a presumption is to incite certain evidence, and
when such function is performed, the presumption no longer exists.110 In
Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc.,111 the Seventh Circuit goes as
far as to say that “the presumption of validity that registration creates is
easily rebuttable, since it merely shifts the burden of production to the
alleged infringer.”112
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
In Royal Palm Props., LLC, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held that the party seeking cancellation of a service
mark has the burden of both production and persuasion to prove that the
mark lacks distinctiveness by a preponderance of the evidence.113
Further, the court of appeals held that holders of registered trademarks
are not granted presumptions of both inherent and acquired
distinctiveness. Rather, registrants are only entitled to one type of
distinctiveness based on whether the registrant brought forth evidence
showing the mark had acquired distinctiveness at the time of
registration.114 Since Royal Palm Props., LLC was a case of first
impression, the Eleventh Circuit sought guidance from other courts
whom previously decided the weight afforded to the presumption.115
Judge Kevin C. Newsom, writing for the court, began the analysis by
addressing Pink Palm’s argument, challenging Royal Palm’s mark on the
ground that the mark lacked distinctiveness and therefore, required
cancellation.116 Pink Palm asserts that Royal Palm’s mark, “Royal Palm
Properties,” lacks distinctiveness on two grounds.117 First, Pink Palm
claims the mark is purely descriptive of the services provided. Second,
Pink Palm contends the mark failed to achieve a secondary meaning.118
Pink Palm contended that Royal Palm had the burden of proving
acquired distinctiveness and claimed the evidence Royal Palm presented

Id. at 172 (citing Liquid Controls Corp., 802 F.2d at 938).
Id.
111 476 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 2007).
112 Id. at 486; see also Door Systems, Inc., 83 F.3d at 172.
113 Royal Palm Props., LLC, 950 F.3d at 783.
114 Id. at 783–84.
115 See id.
116 Id. at 782.
117 Id. at 783.
118 Id.
109
110
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failed to overcome that burden.119 The court reviewed Section 1115(a), of
the Lanham Act,120 for support.121 Section 1115(a) grants owners of
registered marks a presumption of validity, especially for cancellation
proceedings.122 Since the weight of the presumption was a matter of first
impression for this court, the court looked to other circuit courts for
guidance.123 Though there is a split in circuits on this issue, the court was
quick to adopt the majority approach.124
The majority of jurisdictions holds that to overcome the presumption
of validity on a distinctiveness challenge, the party petitioning
cancellation bears both the burden of production and the ultimate burden
of persuasion.125 In Aluminum Fabricating Co., the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the contestant of the
registration merely presenting enough evidence to equal out the scales is
not enough, and only meets the initial burden of production.126 The
Eleventh Circuit followed this rationale and held that in order to move
forward, the party seeking cancellation must overcome the initial burden
of production.127
Only if the party seeking cancellation overcomes the presumption by
a preponderance of the evidence does the burden shift back to the
registrant.128 If the burden shifts to the registrant, the registrant has the
burden of producing evidence proving the distinctiveness of the mark.129
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded, Royal Palms had no burden of
furnishing evidence to support the distinctiveness of its mark.130
Conversely, the burden was on Pink Palm, the party seeking cancellation
of the registration, to prove otherwise.131
Next, the court determined whether the registrant was given both the
presumption of validity on inherent distinctiveness and acquired

119 The weight a court gives to the presumption of validity depends on who bears the
burden of proof. Id. at 785.
120 § 1115(a).
121 Royal Palm Props., LLC, 950 F.3d at 783.
122 Id.; see also § 1115(a).
123 Id. at 784 n.2.
124 Id. at 783–84.
125 Id.; see also Cold War Museum, Inc., 586 F.3d at 1356.
126 Aluminum Fabricating Co., 259 F.2d at 316.
127 Royal Palm Props., LLC, 950 F.3d at 784. The petitioner meeting its initial burden
of production only equals out the presumption of validity but is not enough to prevail on
the claim. Aluminum Fabricating Co., 259 F.2d at 316.
128 Cold War Museum, Inc., 586 F.3d at 1358.
129 Id.
130 Royal Palm Props., LLC, 950 F.3d at 785.
131 Id.
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distinctiveness.132 The court mirrored the holdings of the First and
Eighth Circuits.133 A distinctive service mark identifies the mark with a
single source of goods or services presented.134 Marks can be either
inherently distinctive or acquire distinctiveness over time.135 In
Borinquen Biscuit Corp., the First Circuit held that, where proof of
secondary meaning136 was required during a registration hearing, the
presumption is that the mark is valid based on acquired
distinctiveness.137 Similarly, in Aromatique, Inc., the Eighth Circuit held,
the trademark holder is only entitled to either the presumption of
inherent distinctiveness or acquired distinctiveness, never both.138
Referring back to Royal Palm’s application for registration, the court
recognized that the mark, “Royal Palm Properties,” was applied for under
Section 2(f) of the Lanham Act.139 Section 2(f) deals with marks that
acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning.140 Therefore, the
court held that Royal Palm had a presumption of acquired distinctiveness
only because it presented evidence of secondary meaning at the
registration hearing.141 Accordingly, the court held that a party seeking
cancellation of a registered mark has the burden of overcoming the
trademark holder’s presumption of inherent or acquired distinctiveness
by a preponderance of the evidence.142 And so, due to the decisions in
Royal Palm Props., LLC, the Eleventh Circuit holds that the registrant
receives a presumption of distinctiveness based on whether the
registrant was required to show evidence of secondary meaning at
registration.143 Further, the party seeking cancellation of a registered

Royal Palm Props., LLC, 950 F.3d at 783–84.
Id. This is the majority view. More circuit courts also follow these holdings. 6
McCarthy, supra note 1 § 32:138 n.6.
134 Royal Palm Props., LLC, 950 F.3d at 782 (quoting Welding Servs., Inc., 509 F.3d at
1357).
135 Id.
136 The primary meaning “that a trademark[, service mark] or tradename for a
business . . . or services has acquired even though the trademark or tradename was
originally merely descriptive and therefore not protectable.” Secondary Meaning, Black’s
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
137 Borinquen Biscuit Corp., 443 F.3d at 116–17.
138 Aromatique, Inc., 28 F.3d at 870.
139 Royal Palm Props., LLC, 950 F.3d at 784.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 783.
143 Id. at 784 (quoting Welding Servs., Inc., 509 F.3d at 1357).
132
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mark bears both the burden of production and the burden of
persuasion.144
V. IMPLICATIONS
The issue of how much deference to impose upon the presumption of
a registered trademark has agonized courts for decades.145 In the short
passage of time since the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, the court has relied
upon Royal Palm Props., LLC as the standard for strength afforded to
presumptions of validity.146 Though the Eleventh Circuit set its standard,
the opinion only implicitly stated parts of its stance.147 The court never,
in so many words, stated that both burdens are shifted to the defendant
in a cancellation proceeding.148 The court merely alluded to the
challenger having the burden of presumption by holding that to overcome
the burden, a party seeking cancellation must bring forth more evidence
showing that the registered mark lacked distinctiveness than the
registrant does in the alternative.149 The holding in Royal Palm Props.,
LLC will allow for consistency in future decisions of the Eleventh Circuit
regarding the weight it gives to Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO)
decisions.
In a decision in 2019, the Eleventh Circuit held that courts have no
obligation to follow the PTO’s decision, but left the question unanswered
of how much weight to give the presumption.150 The court’s holding in
Royal Palm Props., LLC sets precedent for giving great respect to the
PTO’s decisions granting or denying a trademark registration in future
decisions. Because the court gives such deference to the PTO’s decision,
the registrant of a mark may attempt to argue that a cancellation claim
cannot be brought because it is barred by the theory of res judicata.151
Though the court should overrule the decision of the PTO only if

Id. at 785.
5 Mark S. Brodin, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 301App.100 (2nd ed. 2020).
146 Engineered Tax Services, Inc. v. Scarpello Consulting, Inc., 958 F.3d 1323, 1329 n.8
(11th Cir. 2020).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Royal Palm Props., LLC, 950 F.3d at 783.
150 6 McCarthy § 32:95 n.3 (citing PlayNation Play Systems, Inc. v. Velex Corporation,
924 F.3d 1159, 1169 (11th Cir. 2019).
151 “[W]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and
final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is
conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different
claim.” B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 575 U.S. 138, 148 (2015) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, p. 250 (1980)).
144
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necessary, the PTO’s decision is not binding on the court.152 But, the
Eleventh Circuit now holds that the court should be at least partially
persuaded by the PTO’s registration decisions.153
The decision in Royal Palm Props., LLC, puts more strain, if
challenged, on owners of inherently distinctive marks. A party who
registers its mark as inherently distinctive no longer has the ability to
fall back on the acquired distinctiveness argument if the court overrules
the decision of the PTO. If the opposing party meets its ultimate burden
of persuasion, proving that the registered mark is inherently distinctive,
the trademark holder no longer has a presumption of validity.154
Congress entrusted the initial determination of whether to grant or deny
registration of a mark with the PTO;155 it is not the court’s job to take
that function away from it.
Compared to presumptions in other areas of civil law, the level of
deference the Eleventh Circuit gave to the presumption of validity in
trademark law proved to be much higher.156 Generally, civil law
presumptions shift only the burden of production to the other party and
the burden of presumption remains with the party who originally had
it.157 The higher burden in trademark law does not stand without reason.
Trademarks require heightened protection because while trademarks
can be highly valuable, they can also be easily destroyed.158 When
consumers no longer associate a mark to a single product, the trademark
becomes abandoned and therefore, lacks trademark protection.159 For
example, consumers likely associate “Q-Tip” with all cotton swabs,
regardless of the producer. And so, even though a mark may once have
been trademark protectable, it loses protection if it fails to remain
distinct.
Trademark protection exists for two reasons: to protect the trademark
holder’s investments and to protect consumers from confusion and
deception.160 When consumers buy a product, they want assurance that
the product they intended to buy is the product they are in fact buying.161
Not all buyers engage in considerable research about products before
6 McCarthy, supra note 150 § 32:95.
See Royal Palm Props., LLC, 950 F.3d 776.
154 Royal Palm Props., LLC, 950 F.3d at 785.
155 Aluminum Fabricating Co., 259 F.2d at 316.
156 1 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence
§ 301.02(3)(b) (Mark S. Brodin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997).
157 Id. at § 301.02(2).
158 A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel., 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923).
159 3 McCarthy § 17:8.
160 1 McCarthy § 2:2.
161 Id.
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they buy them.162 For these buyers, trademarks on products can assure
them that the product is the brand they expect to receive, and not a
knock-off.163 In essence, a trademark promotes production of higher
quality products and services.164 If a company knows a consumer can
trace the product or service back to that company, it has a greater
obligation to create better quality products.165 Without trademarks,
consumers would be unable to distinguish one brand from another, giving
the company no incentive to improve the products’ quality.166 The
businesses that had the lowest price would attract the majority of
customers.167
Trademark owners retain a strong interest in the protection of their
mark partly because a registered mark adds value to the owner’s
products and goodwill.168 In order to register a trademark, registrants
must put forth generous amounts of energy and money.169 The benefits
received from trademark protection make the effort the registrant
exerted prior to registration worth it. For instance, a trademark owner
can sell its products at a higher price because of the trademark and
goodwill associated with the brand.170 Further, trademark protection
grants the owner exclusive use of the mark, which protects the owner
from other companies selling products with the same mark, and thus,
reaping the benefits of the trademark holder’s efforts. Therefore, the
grant of a registered trademark should be afforded great deference and
protection when challenged in court.
It is clear from the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Royal Palm Props.,
LLC, that the court wants to leave the decision to grant a trademark
registration, unless proven by strong evidence otherwise, into the care of
the Patent and Trademark Office where Congress entrusted it.
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Id. at § 2:25 n.2.
Id. at n.5.
164 Id. at § 2:4.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Good will is the customer’s positive attitude towards a business, resulting in
continued patronage. Id. at § 2:2.
169 Id.
170 Id. at § 2:4 n.2.
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